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THE EMERGING DEFENCE OF 
REPORTAGE 
Nadine Zoë Armstrong* 
This article tracks recent developments in the law of defamation, exploring United Kingdom cases 
where journalists have advanced a defence of reportage. This reportage defence is intended to 
protect the journalist from a defamation action where there has only been neutral reporting of 
defamatory allegations which are neither adopted nor embellished. The progress of this nascent 
defence in several United Kingdom cases is traced, including the most extensive development made 
in the case of Roberts v Gable. This article then proceeds to elucidate the parameters of the new 
defence, focussing particularly on the tone of the reporting, how the report has to be of the fact that 
the statement was made, and the particular context in which the defence has so far succeeded. The 
justifying rationales for the defence are then explored and critiqued. The potential application of 
such a defence to a New Zealand context is then considered, revealing how such a development is 
not plausible in the near future. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the United Kingdom it is becoming increasingly questionable whether Lord Denning's 
observation that "English law does not love tale-bearers"1 continues to hold true. Recent advances 
in the law of defamation appear to be more accepting towards tale-bearers of the modern age; indeed 
tale-bearing may be one of the more "responsible" forms of journalism, and actually warrant 
protection rather than disdain. 
This article examines the emerging defence of reportage. In the seminal case of Roberts v Gable 
Ward LJ described reportage as "the neutral reporting without adoption or embellishment or 
subscribing to any belief in its truth of attributed allegations of both sides of a political and possibly 
some other kind of dispute."2 In order to properly appreciate the development of this new defence 
the landscape of qualified privilege will first be explored; followed by discussion of the parameters 
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2  Roberts v Gable [2008] QB 502, para 53 (CA) Ward LJ [Roberts v Gable (CA)].  
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of reportage as demonstrated in several recent cases. Although there remains some controversy over 
the requirements of this new defence, it is generally accepted that the purpose of the publication 
must be to report "the fact that it was said."3 This requirement will be examined as well as the 
requisite tone of reporting and the context in which the defence operates. Subsequently, by 
discussing the Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd4 (Reynolds) factors the divergence between 
'traditional' Reynolds qualified privilege and reportage will be addressed. 
The reportage defence has been disguised as a subspecies of the law of qualified privilege5 and 
thus the policy behind it has not been well scrutinised. However, because this defence alters the 
protection afforded to those publishing defamatory statements it therefore warrants careful 
consideration of the principles at stake.  This is especially so in light of the repetition rule which 
appears to have been subverted by the introduction of the reportage defence. Other criticisms of the 
defence include its resistance to defeat by a claim of malice as well as potentially discouraging 
verification of sources. A brief examination of the New Zealand qualified privilege scene will 
demonstrate how the reportage defence is not consistent with the current approach, and how any 
such development would involve significant, possibly unwarranted, changes. 
II QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE DEVELOPMENTS – SOME BACKGROUND 
A Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd6 
The Reynolds case marked the start of a more liberal application of the law of qualified privilege 
to publications made to the world at large. The case concerns proceedings brought by Mr Reynolds 
against the Times Newspaper, following his resignation as Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland.7 
The publication in the British mainland edition was held to carry the defamatory imputation that Mr 
Reynolds had deliberately and dishonestly misled the Irish House of Representatives and his cabinet 
colleagues.8  
The defendants argued for a generic qualified privilege to cover all political comment published 
by news media.9 Distinguishing political comment from other matters of public concern was held to 
be unsound. However, it was conceded that common law qualified privilege could be available to 
  
3  Charman v Orion Publishing Group [2008] 1 All ER 750, para 50 (CA) Ward LJ (emphasis in the original) 
[Charman (CA)]. 
4  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) [Reynolds]. 
5  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 60 Ward LJ.  
6  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd, above n 4. 
7  Ibid, 191 Lord Nicholls. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid, 192 Lord Nicholls. 
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publications in the news media.10 The proviso was that it had to be a piece of responsible 
journalism that satisfied the duty-interest test, or in other words the public had a right to know the 
particular information.11 In order to determine whether these criteria were satisfied Lord Nicholls 
provided a non-exhaustive list of "matters to be taken into account":12 
 
(1) The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is 
misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true; 
(2) The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public 
concern; 
(3) The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some 
have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories; 
(4) The steps taken to verify the information; 
(5) The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an 
investigation which commands respect; 
(6) The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity; 
(7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not 
possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be necessary; 
(8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story; 
(9) The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not 
adopt allegations as statements of fact; 
(10) The circumstances of the publication, including the timing. 
Lord Nicholls stressed that the importance of each of these factors and others will vary 
depending on the circumstances of the case.13 His Lordship also added a "general exhortation"14 
that "[a]ny lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication"15 so that the court should 
be "slow to conclude that the publication was not in the public interest"16 especially where the 
 
10  Ibid, 204 Lord Nicholls. 
11  Ibid, 197 Lord Nicholls. 
12  Ibid, 205 Lord Nicholls. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd [2005] EMLR 115, para 154 (QB) Eady J [Galloway (QB)].   
15  Reynolds, above n 4, 205 Lord Nicholls. 
16  Ibid. 
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publication concerns political discussion.17 As noted by Godwin Busuttil at the heart of the 
Reynolds decision "lay the encouragement of high quality, public interest journalism,"18 especially 
of the investigative variety.19 
B Jameel and Another v Wall Street Journal Europe (No 3) (Jameel)20 
Jameel is of particular interest for examining the approach the House of Lords took to Reynolds 
qualified privilege. The case involved an article in the Wall Street Journal Europe claiming that the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority was monitoring bank accounts at the request of United States 
law enforcement agencies, to prevent them from being used wittingly or unwittingly for the 
funnelling of funds to terrorist organisations.21 The plaintiff was among those named as having its 
accounts monitored.22 The defendants successfully established a qualified privilege defence, as the 
journalism was deemed to be responsible reporting of matters of public concern.23 There was a 
clear split in the House of Lords as to the proper characterisation of the Reynolds defence. The 
majority (Lords Bingham, Scott and Hope) considered that the Reynolds case still retained the 
underlying common law test of whether there was a duty to publish the information and a 
corresponding interest of the public to receive it.  
 
By contrast Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale were of the view that the defence in Reynolds is 
"a different jurisprudential creature from the traditional form of privilege from which it sprang".24 
They did not think it an embodiment of the "old law"25 of the duty-interest test. Instead they thought 
that "[i]f the publication is in the public interest, the duty and interest are taken to exist";26 so the 
Reynolds defence is best characterised as "a defence of publication in the public interest."27 
Although there was conflict in Jameel as to the precise characterisation of the defence there was 
 
17  Ibid. 
18  Godwin Busuttil "Current Defamation Issues Reportage: A Not Entirely Neutral Report" (5RB Media and 
Entertainment Law Conference 2008, London, 24 September 2008), para 1. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Jameel Mohammed and Another v Wall Street Journal Europe (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359 (HL) [Jameel]. 
21  Ibid, para 4 Lord Bingham. 
22  Ibid.        
23  Ibid, para 111 Lord Hoffmann. 
24  Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 2-5) [2002] QB 783, para 35 (CA) Lord Phillips MR for the 
Court. 
25  Jameel, above n 20, para 57 Lord Hoffmann. 
26  Ibid, para 50 Lord Hoffmann.  
27  Ibid, para 146 Baroness Hale. 
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unanimous acceptance of a "practical and flexible"28 approach which adhered to the "liberalising 
intention of the Reynolds decision."29 
III THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPORTAGE DEFENCE 
A Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd (Al-Fagih)30 
Al-Fagih is credited with giving rise to the reportage defence in the United Kingdom.31 This 
case concerned the reporting of a dispute between two prominent members of a Saudi Arabian 
dissident political organisation (based in the United Kingdom), opposed to the existing Saudi 
Arabian government.32 The newspaper (which supports the Saudi Arabian government and is partly 
owned by the Saudi Arabian royal family)33 reported an allegation by Dr Al Mas'aari that the 
Claimant, Al-Fagih, had spread malicious rumours about him.34 After a trial Smith J held that the 
defence of qualified privilege failed largely because the newspaper had made no attempt to verify 
this allegation, which was made by an obviously partisan source.35 Smith J considered that an 
attempt at verification would have been very easy.36 
On appeal, counsel for the defendant (appellant) advanced a Reynolds defence of qualified 
privilege.37 However, he argued that within the broad Reynolds approach considerations such as the 
fact that the allegation was attributed, unadopted, and in the political sphere, required that the 
qualified privilege defence should be upheld.38 It is thus important to note that no doctrine of 
"neutral reporting" (as is seen in the United States of America) was actually contended for.39 
However, it seems that arguing for these "important and often decisive considerations"40 to warrant 
  
28  Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300, para 24 (PC) Lord Nicholls for the Court.  
29  Jameel, above n 20, para 35 Lord Bingham. 
30  Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2002] EMLR 215 (CA) [Al-Fagih (CA)]. 
31  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 34 Ward LJ. 
32  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 2 Simon Brown LJ. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid, para 3 Simon Brown LJ. 
35  Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd (28 July 2000) EWHC (QB) para 58 Smith J [Al-
Fagih (QB)].  
36  Ibid, para 62 Smith J.  
37  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 27 Simon Brown LJ.  
38  Ibid.  
39  Patrick Milmo and WVH Rogers (ed) Gatley on Libel and Slander (10 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2004) 461. 
40  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 27 Simon Brown LJ. 
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the defence of qualified privilege pinpointed this case as the origin for the subspecies of Reynolds 
privilege now referred to as reportage. 
The beginnings of the reportage defence can be seen in the following features of the Al-Fagih 
case. The information published was "in the course of what was undoubtedly a political dispute."41 
It was also significant that by reporting these mutual allegations, one or other if not both of the 
leading members of the political organisation were being shown to be disreputable.42 These factors 
established the public interest.43 Latham LJ observed that the reporting of the split in the political 
group was clearly of significant interest to its readers such that what was said by one side in relation 
to the other is of considerable interest.44 This was so "whether what is said is of high political 
importance, or merely scurrilous gossip or personal accusations."45 In summary "[i]t is the fact that 
the allegation of a particular nature has been made which is in this context important, and not 
necessarily its truth or falsity."46  
Another important feature is that the allegations were clearly attributed to Dr Al Mas'aari and 
not adopted by the newspaper.47 Simon Brown LJ seemingly thought that this factor entitled the 
newspaper to publish without attempting verification. However his Lordship acknowledged that 
there will be circumstances in which verification of a third party's allegations will be appropriate 
and perhaps even essential.48 Latham LJ noted that the need for verification will depend on the 
facts, commenting that in the context of allegation, counter-allegation and refutation where 
attribution is clear, verification may be significant only if the allegations are such that the 
ramifications go well beyond the ambit of the dispute; for example allegations of criminality.49 
So although there was no argument in Al-Fagih for an expansion of the law to allow a doctrine 
of "neutral reportage" as exists in the United States of America,50 it seems that the features of this 
  
41  Ibid, para 49 Simon Brown LJ.  
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid, para 65 Latham LJ.  
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid, para 39 Simon Brown LJ. 
48  Ibid, para 51 Simon Brown LJ. 
49  Ibid, para 68 Latham LJ. 
50  See generally Dorothy A Bowles "Neutral Reportage as a Defense Against Republishing Libel" (1989) 11 
Comm & L, 3. 
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case of qualified privilege bear the hallmarks of such a defence and so this case paved the way for 
further development in the reportage sphere. 
B Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd (Galloway)51 
The reportage defence was further explored in the case of Galloway. The Daily Telegraph 
defendants published articles including documents that were found by its journalists in the Iraqi 
foreign ministry in Baghdad shortly after the invasion by coalition forces in 2003.52 These articles 
were held to suggest among other things that Mr George Galloway MP had been personally 
receiving money from Saddam Hussein's regime.53 In the High Court, Eady J carefully considered 
the approach taken in Al-Fagih and identified some significant potential distinctions between Al-
Fagih and the facts of Galloway.54 It is worth noting that Eady J delivered this judgment before 
Jameel, but it was not cited to the House of Lords in that case. The distinctions Eady J identified 
were that although there was a political dimension to the case, this was not an instance of public 
figures making allegations and cross-allegations and thus giving rise to a dispute which would itself 
be of inherent public interest.55 Furthermore this was "not a case where one or other, or both, of two 
persons could be shown to be disreputable by the very nature of the allegations being made (whether 
true or false)."56 Eady J considered that it would need to be determined whether the defamatory 
imputations were adopted or implied as true, whether the articles were "fully, fairly and 
disinterestedly"57 reporting the content of the Baghdad documents and Mr Galloway's response,58 
and whether the articles went beyond reporting the documents and made independent allegations or 
inferences.59 
After examining the circumstances of publication Eady J determined that the defendants were 
not neutral in their reporting; not only did they adopt the allegations but "[t]hey embraced them with 
relish and fervour … [and] went on to embellish them."60 The Court of Appeal upheld Eady J's 
finding and agreed with his Honour's analysis of the distinctions between Al-Fagih and the present 
  
51  Galloway (QB), above n 14; Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd [2006] EMLR 221 (CA) [Galloway (CA)]. 
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53  Galloway (CA), above n 51, para 21 Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
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55  Ibid. 
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case.61 It is unclear how these distinctions would have impacted on the decision had the defence not 
failed for the reason that the allegations were adopted by the newspaper. As noted by Godwin 
Busuttil62 the Court of Appeal in Galloway apparently thought that although verification of the 
allegations was not necessary it would still be important to give "Mr Galloway a fair opportunity to 
respond to them."63 
C Roberts v Gable 
1 First instance decision 
The most comprehensive exploration of the reportage defence to date was made in Roberts v 
Gable. This case concerned an article in the Searchlight magazine which formed part of a series of 
articles intermittently covering a "feud" between different factions of the British National Party in 
the London area.64 The particular article complained of, reported a letter issued by Messrs Hill and 
Jeffries in reply to accusations made against them by the claimants, Christopher and Barry Roberts. 
Eady J analysed the case using the reportage subcategory of qualified privilege.  
Eady J applied the Court of Appeal's analysis in Al-Fagih, and went on to apply the ten factors 
identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, although noting how these tests do not apply comfortably 
to a reportage case.65 It was found that the allegations were serious,66 there was legitimate interest 
in the subject-matter by the general public and in particular the electorate,67 and there was no 
urgency about the matter.68 No steps were taken to verify the information but this was not 
determined to be fatal "in a reportage case, where the fact of the allegations being made is what is 
important";69 furthermore the source70 and status of the information were found to be less 
significant in the reportage context given the allegations were attributed.71 No comment was sought 
from either claimant but this was deemed reasonable in the circumstances.72 The tone of the article 
  
61  Galloway (CA), above n 51, para 31 Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
62   Busuttil, above n 18, footnote 21. 
63  Galloway (CA), above n 51, para 48 Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 
64  Roberts v Gable [2006] EMLR 692, para 3 (QB) Eady J [Roberts v Gable (QB)].  
65  Ibid, para 35 Eady J.  
66  Ibid, para 26 Eady J.  
67  Ibid, para 27 Eady J.  
68  Ibid, para 31 Eady J.  
69  Ibid, para 28 Eady J.  
70  Ibid, para 29 Eady J.   
71  Ibid, para 30 Eady J.  
72  Ibid, para 32 Eady J. 
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was neutral with the allegations being reported and not adopted;73 it was also significant that the 
dispute was taking place in a political context.74 These factors established a duty to publish and a 
corresponding interest in the public receiving the information; this was especially so because the 
magazine had already covered the allegations against Messrs Hill and Jeffries and so it was 
incumbent on it to cover their denials.75  
2 Court of Appeal decision 
The Court of Appeal upheld Eady J's finding and approved of his Honour's application of the 
principles of reportage. Ward LJ (with whom Moore-Bick LJ agreed)76 characterised the defence of 
reportage as it was in Al-Fagih as "a form of, or a special example of, Reynolds' qualified 
privilege".77 Ward LJ believed that reportage cannot be a defence sui generis given that it is 
founded on the same underlying rationale as Reynolds, which is "the public policy demand for there 
to be a duty to impart the information and an interest in receiving it".78 Furthermore a generic 
qualified privilege for political speech was denied in Reynolds so a generic qualified privilege for 
reportage must also be rejected.79 Ward LJ then outlined the matters to be taken into account when 
considering whether there is a defence of reportage.80  
The first matter Ward LJ identified is that the information must be in the public interest81 
(which is to be judged at the moment of publication).82 Second, contrary to traditional Reynolds 
privilege "[i]n a true case of reportage there is no need to take steps to ensure the accuracy of the 
published information."83 Third, "[t]o qualify as reportage the report, judging the thrust of it as a 
whole, must have the effect of reporting, not the truth of the statements, but the fact that they were 
made."84 Fourth, it is for the judge to establish objectively the effect of the article as a whole, taking 
into account all the circumstances surrounding the gathering of information, the manner of its 
  
73  Ibid, para 34 Eady J.  
74  Ibid, paras 15, 36 Eady J.  
75  Ibid, para 36 Eady J. 
76  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 78 Moore-Bick LJ. 
77  Ibid, para 60 Ward LJ. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid, para 61 Ward LJ. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
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reporting, and the purpose to be served.85 Fifth, the report must be unadopted and reported "in a 
fair, disinterested and neutral way."86 The sixth matter is that defendant bears the burden of 
ensuring that the publication meets the standards of responsible journalism as the concept has 
developed from Reynolds.87 In determining this point reference must be made to all the 
circumstances of the case and the ten Reynolds factors "adjusted as may be necessary for the special 
nature of reportage".88 The seventh matter to be considered is the seriousness of the allegation, 
which impacts upon the critical question of whether the public has a "right to know the fact that 
these allegations were being made one against the other".89 The more serious the allegation, the 
more it is required to make a real contribution to the public interest element in the article.90 The 
eighth point is that there is no need for the defendant to be a responsible prominent person or for the 
claimant to be a public figure.91 Finally Ward LJ commented that urgency is relevant such that 
editorial judgments made in the haste of a pressing deadline may require more allowance to be made 
than those decisions made with the luxury of time.92 His Lordship also commented that the note of 
sarcasm in the article, and the "unfeigned glee" at having reported this embarrassment to their 
political enemies was not fatal to the finding of responsible journalism.93  
 
Sedley LJ accepted the submission that because the reportage defence modifies the repetition 
rule (discussed below)94 it needs to be treated restrictively.95 His Lordship also commented that 
"nothing in the law denies the reportage defence to a defendant who is taking a perceptible pleasure 
in reporting the controversy."96 Sedley LJ, disagreeing with Latham LJ in Al-Fagih, was of the view 
that "the more personal and scurrilous the content of the reported controversy, the less likely it is 
that the controversy itself will be a matter of genuine public interest".97 Furthermore his Lordship 
did not think that severe accusations such as those of criminality should require verification, 
 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Ibid; Jameel, above n 20, para 51 Lord Hoffmann. 
91  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 61 Ward LJ. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Ibid, para 70 Ward LJ.  
94  See Part V A Potential Inconsistency with the Repetition Rule.  
95  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 74 Sedley LJ. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Ibid, para 76 Sedley LJ. 
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provided that the subject-matter is such as to make the controversy itself a matter of public 
interest.98  
D Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd (Charman)99 
Charman demonstrates the interaction between the reportage defence and the 'traditional' 
Reynolds qualified privilege.100 The Claimant was an officer in the Metropolitan Police who was 
seeking damages in respect of allegations made in a book entitled Bent Coppers.101 The passages in 
question bore the defamatory meaning that there were "cogent grounds to suspect Mr Charman 
abused his position as a police officer by colluding … in the commission of substantial fraud".102 
The defence of reportage failed in both the High Court and Court of Appeal, though the work was 
held to be responsible journalism in the Court of Appeal under the traditional Reynolds approach.103 
When addressing the argument for a reportage defence Ward LJ applied the considerations outlined 
in Roberts v Gable.  
Ward LJ stressed that the defence will be admitted only if the effect of repeating the allegation is 
to report the fact the allegation was made and not the truth of the defamatory material.104 In 
Charman this "defining characteristic of reportage is missing" because rather than report the fact 
that allegations of corruption were made and denied, the effect of the book is to tell the inside story 
of the corruption.105 Ward LJ found that this attribute was enough to doom the entire reportage 
defence.106 His Lordship emphasised that it is important to determine whether the author has made 
the allegations his own107 and this is a question that need not be complicated by issues of the 
report's meaning.108 Ward LJ also highlighted the distinction between the bloodhound and 
watchdog roles of the media;109 with reportage protecting only the latter function. Sedley LJ agreed 
  
98  Ibid. 
99  Charman (CA), above n 3. 
100  Ibid, para 4 Ward LJ. 
101  Ibid, para 1 Ward LJ. 
102  Ibid, para 2 Ward LJ. 
103  Charman (CA), above n 3. 
104  Ibid, para 50 Ward LJ. 
105  Ibid, para 49 Ward LJ.  
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid, para 56 Ward LJ. 
108  Ibid, para 55 Ward LJ. 
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that this case could not possibly fall within the bounds of the reportage defence.110 Despite failing 
under the reportage defence the work was deemed to be responsible because this was just "the sort 
of neutral, investigative journalism which Reynolds privilege exists to protect."111 
 
E Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v Houston (Radu)112 
The most recent exploration of the reportage defence is seen in Radu, where the Claimant (the 
husband of Princess Margarita, daughter of the former King of Romania)113 sued over an article in a 
magazine called Royalty Monthly.114 The defamatory effect of the article was that there was a very 
strong case that the Claimant was an imposter relying on a false document, who had used his rank to 
deceive people into allowing him access to social circles and official positions, and that he had 
created a security risk by exposing himself to blackmail, and had falsely claimed to have been 
adopted by the Hohenzollerns.115 Eady J applied the law of reportage elucidated in the above 
judgments. Eady J commented that the warning provided by Sedley LJ in Roberts v Gable that this 
defence "needs to be treated restrictively",116 refers to the fact that it is important that the 
circumstances of each case are examined to make sure that it really is a case of reportage.117 Eady J 
noted that "an article does not lose the status of 'report' merely by including other material by way of 
background or journalistic colour, but a reader should be able to recognise what is reporting and 
what is not."118 The defamatory allegations must be found in the reporting part in order to be 
afforded the reportage defence.119  
Furthermore Eady J stated that the article would have to be carefully balanced so that the readers 
would be able to ascertain broadly what each side was saying.120 The reportage defence was not 
allowed in Radu as there was no such balance; the scales were heavily tilted against the Claimant as 
there was no evidence in the article of the Claimant's response.121 Eady J concluded that the 
 
110  Ibid, para 88 Sedley LJ. 
111  Jameel, above n 20, para 35 Lord Bingham. 
112  Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v Houston [2007] EWHC 2735 (QB) Eady J [Radu]. 
113  Ibid, para 2 Eady J.  
114  Ibid, para 4 Eady J. 
115  Ibid, para 6 Eady J. 
116  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 74 Sedley LJ.  
117  Radu, above n 112, para 18 Eady J. 
118  Ibid, para 25 Eady J. 
119  Ibid, para 26 Eady J. 
120  Ibid, para 37 Eady J. 
121  Ibid, para 40 Eady J. 
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circumstances were unlike those found in Roberts v Gable "where the readers could infer that there 
were two conflicting accounts but could draw no ready conclusion as to which was correct."122 
Therefore it appears that such balance is imperative for the success of the reportage defence. 
IV EXPLORING THE REPORTAGE DEFENCE  
It can therefore be seen that several principles have emerged which are crucial to establishing 
the defence of reportage. This defence appears to be available in instances of responsible 
journalism123 where the purpose of the report is to convey the fact that certain allegations have been 
made,124 and the report conveys both sides fully fairly and disinterestedly in a neutral way,125 
without adopting or embellishing any of the allegations.126 If these criteria are satisfied and there is 
a public interest at the time of publication in the fact that the allegations are being made (rather than 
their truth or falsity), there is no duty upon the author to verify the truth of the allegations.127 A 
closer examination of each of the elements of the defence is necessary in order to identify their 
appropriate ambit of application.  
A Tone of the Reporting 
A key feature of the reportage defence is that the piece of journalism is neutrally reported, so 
that allegations are attributed and not endorsed or embellished.128 In Al-Fagih this is summarised by 
Simon Brown LJ in the phrase "fully, fairly and disinterestedly".129 Ward LJ in Charman says the 
issue is whether the author made the allegations his own by espousing or concurring in the charges, 
whether it was "a full, fair and accurate report"  or whether the author has taken over it and 
transformed it such that it is no longer a report.130 However the mere inclusion of background 
material is permissible.131  
As well as the requirement of neutrality, 'tone' has been further discussed in the context of 
reportage. In Radu Eady J noted that "reliance on this form of privilege does not entail that any 
  
122  Ibid, para 40 Eady J.              
123  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 61 Ward LJ; Charman (CA), above n 3, para 48 Ward LJ.  
124  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 65 Latham LJ; Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 61 Ward LJ; 
Charman (CA), above n 3, para 50 Ward LJ.  
125  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 52 Simon Brown LJ; Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 61 Ward LJ. 
126  Charman (CA), above n 3, para 56 Ward LJ. 
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special 'tone' needs to be adopted."132 Eady J referred to the comment by Sedley LJ in Roberts v 
Gable that the reportage defence would not be denied to a defendant "who is taking a perceptible 
pleasure in reporting the controversy."133 Ward LJ in Roberts v Gable did not find it significant that 
the report contained "a note of sarcasm" or that it was reported with "some unfeigned glee" at 
having embarrassed their political opponents.134 It is therefore apparent that within the bounds of 
neutral reporting there still exists a degree of journalistic licence; even allowing a degree of 
Schadenfreude.  
Sedley LJ in Roberts v Gable believed that Baroness Hale's comment in Jameel that "the tone in 
which the information is conveyed will be relevant to whether or not the publisher has behaved 
responsibly in passing it on"135 did not mean that the reportage defence was to be "a prize for bland 
journalism", but rather that the defence may be forfeited by a presentation which undermines the 
public interest it purports to serve.136 The tantalising question remains of course at what stage do 
"perceptible pleasure"137 and "unfeigned glee"138 stray into the realm of an unbalanced report. This 
will depend on the circumstances of the case and will involve some difficult judgments based on the 
style of reporting. Regrettably, space precludes further exploration of this point. 
Allowing scope for journalistic licence appears to be consistent with emerging jurisprudence 
from the European Court of Human Rights. In Thoma v Luxembourg (Thoma) it was held that it is 
not appropriate for the law to insist that journalists should formally distance themselves from the 
content of a quotation.139 In Selistö v Finland it was acknowledged that journalists cannot be 
expected to act with total objectivity but must be allowed some degree of exaggeration and even 
provocation.140 The principle in Thoma was also affirmed in the case of Verlagsgruppe News 
GMBH v Austria (Verlagsgruppe), where the Court commented that such a requirement could not be 
reconciled with the "press's role of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas".141 
Despite these observations, as Godwin Busuttil notes, "[i]t is a mistake to think that reportage as a 
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defence is compelled by Strasbourg jurisprudence."142 Instead these comments are simply useful 
indicia when considering broader questions as to acceptable tone of reporting.   
B A Report of the Fact that the Statement Was Made  
As acknowledged by Ward LJ in Charman, in order to be protected by the reportage defence the 
purpose and effect of the publication must be to report "the fact that it was said."143 This distinction 
is analogous to the rules for admitting hearsay evidence.144  
In Al-Fagih Latham LJ believed that in the reportage context it would not matter whether what 
was said was of high political importance or mere scurrilous gossip.145 Sedley LJ in Roberts v 
Gable disagreed, intimating that there may not be a public interest in knowing that allegations of a 
very personal and scurrilous nature had been made.146 With respect, it appears to the author that the 
more personal and scurrilous the allegations the more the public is informed about the character of 
the person making them.147 Furthermore, if it is the fact of the dispute that is important the subject-
matter should be of little moment. It seems inconsistent to allow reportage to protect neutral 
reporting of only certain subject-matter, given the House of Lords in Reynolds expressly declined to 
limit the subject-matter to which qualified privilege applied by rejecting a generic defence for 
political matters.  
The fact that the allegations are made usually serves to tell the reader something about the 
people making those allegations.148 Therefore although there is no specific requirement that the 
defendant be a responsible prominent person or the claimant be a public figure,149 it seems that they 
must nonetheless be people of sufficient prominence in order to generate a public interest in the fact 
that allegations were made by or against them. This is alluded to in Roberts v Gable by Ward LJ in 
the comment "[t]he relevant factors properly applied will embrace the significance of the 
protagonists in public life".150 
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C Context of Application of the Reportage Defence 
In both cases where the defence of reportage was upheld (Al-Fagih and Roberts v Gable) the 
publication was made in the course of reporting allegations and counter-allegations made in a 
political context. It is uncertain how integral both political nature and reciprocity of allegations will 
be to the success of the reportage defence. Eady J in Roberts v Gable commented that it is "obvious 
that the political significance of a publication will often be an important factor in determining the 
merits of a privilege plea."151 So whilst not decisive the political nature of a dispute is likely to be 
significant in establishing the public interest in the fact that the allegations were made. 
In Al-Fagih the defence is thought likely to be available where "both sides to a political dispute 
are being … reported in their respective allegations and responses."152 Therefore it seems this 
defence envisages covering mutual allegations and responses, as was the factual pattern of the case. 
Latham LJ discussed the allegation and counter-allegation context in Al-Fagih, commenting that the 
structure of reporting in that case conveyed that the allegation was likely to be met by refutation 
and/or counter-allegation, which was what subsequently occurred.153 Similarly in Roberts v Gable 
Eady J noted that there was a duty to publish especially because those making the allegations had 
already had allegations reported against them.154 This strengthened the public interest in the reader 
being informed and thus the corresponding duty to publish.155 In Charman Sedley LJ was of the 
view that the reportage doctrine could not logically be confined to the reporting of reciprocal 
allegations, and that "[a] unilateral libel, reported disinterestedly, will be equally protected."156  
In Radu, Eady J noted that for reportage to succeed the matter must be carefully balanced so that 
readers would broadly understand what each side was saying.157 Furthermore Eady J stated that the 
circumstances in Radu were not like those in Roberts v Gable "where the readers could infer that 
there were two conflicting accounts but could draw no ready conclusion as to which was 
correct."158 Thus one of the reasons the reportage defence failed in Radu is the Claimant's side of 
the story was not reported. In the case of Malik v Newspost Ltd Eady J made the obiter remark that 
"if both sides of the controversy were fairly and disinterestedly reported, there might be a reportage 
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defence".159 Therefore despite Sedley LJ's comment in Charman it appears that typically 
reciprocity of allegations is required for reportage. 
 
D Responsible Journalism – The Reynolds Factors in the Reportage Context 
Alongside public interest, responsible journalism is a hallmark of Reynolds qualified privilege. 
Responsible journalism is usually determined by reference to Lord Nicholls' ten non-exhaustive 
elements identified in Reynolds. Eady J noted in Roberts v Gable that these factors do not appear to 
fit the reportage template as well as they fit circumstances where the defamatory allegations are 
adopted, yet it was still right to consider them.160 Ward LJ elaborated in Roberts v Gable saying 
that the publication must meet the standards of responsible journalism which can be ascertained by 
reference to Lord Nicholls' factors adjusted as may be necessary for the special nature of 
reportage.161 It is therefore important to consider how these factors have been modified by the 
reportage context. 
The first Reynolds factor is the seriousness of the allegations. This factor is specifically listed in 
Roberts v Gable as one that must be taken into account when determining whether there is a defence 
of reportage.162 The more serious the allegation the more harm will be done to the person's 
reputation if it is untrue.163 Latham LJ in Al-Fagih was of the view that if the allegations were so 
serious that the ramifications went beyond the ambit of the dispute then this would require 
verification of the allegation.164 Sedley LJ in Roberts v Gable disagreed with this comment instead 
focusing on the question of whether the subject-matter was in the public interest, rather than how 
serious the allegations were.165 It appears that the more serious the allegation the more important it 
is that it makes a real contribution to the public interest element in the article.166 
The second Reynolds factor is whether the subject-matter of the publication is a matter of public 
concern.167 In the reportage context it seems that the interest lies in the fact that the allegations were 
made and not in their truth or falsity. Yet presumably in some contexts even the fact that the 
allegations were made will not be in the public interest. This might be the case if neither those 
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making the allegations nor those thereby defamed are public figures or have any other special 
status.168  
Greater divergence between traditional Reynolds qualified privilege and the subcategory of 
reportage can be seen concerning the third and fifth Reynolds factors. The third factor, the source of 
the information,169 is of less significance in a reportage context because "it is not the reliability of 
either side which matters so much as the nature of the quarrel."170 So too the fifth Reynolds factor 
of the status of the information171 would differ in a reportage context, because as the allegations are 
attributed the reader can decide for themselves the reliability of the source.  
The greatest divergence exists with respect to the fourth Reynolds factor of steps taken to verify 
the information.172 Indeed it is a defining characteristic of the defence that provided there is neutral 
reporting of the fact the allegations were made, verification is unnecessary.173 The reason for this 
divergence from traditional expectations of responsible journalism is again because it is the fact that 
the statements are made which is important.174 As Ward LJ describes in Roberts v Gable the author 
"is absolved from that responsibility because he is simply reporting in a neutral fashion the fact that 
it has been said without adopting the truth."175 Presumably it would be necessary to ensure that the 
person to whom the allegation is attributed did in fact make it, but it would not be necessary to 
verify the truth of the allegation itself. In Roberts v Gable Sedley LJ acknowledges that whether 
responsible journalism calls for verification "will be a case- and fact-specific question,"176 although 
his Lordship concedes that in a great many cases verification of the truth will be beside the point.177 
It is questionable whether ease of verification is relevant. In both Al-Fagih and Roberts v Gable 
verification of the truth of the allegations could arguably be regarded as more difficult. However 
there are conflicting opinions as to precisely how onerous verification would have been in Al-Fagih: 
whilst Simon Brown LJ seems to imply that such verification would have been difficult,178 Smith J 
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(with whom Godwin Busuttil agrees)179 thought that it would be very easy.180 Irrespective of these 
differing opinions the Court of Appeal in Al-Fagih did not hold that it was a straightforward matter 
to verify. Therefore perhaps it is implicit in the defence of reportage that neutral reporting will only 
absolve the author of a requirement to verify the truth of the allegations, if such verification would 
require more than just a simple check. Indeed such a caveat would be consistent with the notion of 
responsible journalism and would prevent the defence of reportage from undermining this standard 
which the law has strived to enforce.  
The sixth Reynolds factor is the urgency of the matter,181 Ward LJ in Roberts v Gable listed this 
as a factor to be taken into account when considering whether there is a reportage defence.182 It is 
unclear precisely how this factor should apply in a reportage context. Usually the less urgent the 
publication is the more incumbent it is upon a responsible journalist to verify the accuracy of the 
material to be published; however as mentioned above there is no such duty to verify in a reportage 
context. Perhaps if the publication was made hastily in order to comply with an urgent deadline, 
more allowance could be made when determining whether the other criteria of the reportage defence 
are met, such as neutrality and the report being of the fact that the statements were made and not 
their truth or falsity.  
The seventh Reynolds factor is whether comment was sought from the plaintiff.183 It seems that 
this point is not crucial because it is the fact of the cross-allegations which is important rather than 
the extent of their accuracy.184 On appeal in Roberts v Gable Sedley LJ commented that to suggest 
it was irresponsible to publish without first soliciting the claimant's side of the story was "not 
entirely in touch with reality."185 Therefore this factor is likely to be less significant in a reportage 
context. 
The eighth factor identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds is whether the article contained the 
gist of the plaintiff's side of the story.186 This factor seems intrinsic to the crucial requirement of the 
reportage defence identified by Eady J in Radu that the report must be carefully balanced, such that 
the readers can broadly understand what each side was saying.187 The ninth Reynolds factor is that 
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of tone of the article;188 as outlined above, for the reportage defence to succeed the tone must be 
neutral and the allegations must not be adopted.189 The tenth Reynolds factor is that the 
circumstances of the publication including the timing must be taken into account.190 This factor 
seems equally applicable in the reportage context. In summary, however, it seems that there does 
need to be some considerable adjustment to certain Reynolds factors in order to appropriately apply 
them to the reportage defence.  
V EVALUATING THE REPORTAGE DEFENCE 
A Potential Inconsistency with the Repetition Rule 
The repetition rule provides that it is not a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to 
prove that he was purely repeating what he had been told.191 Every republication of a libel is treated 
as a new libel, and each publisher is liable as if the defamatory statement had originated with 
them.192 In Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway the justice of the rule was demonstrated because in that case 
a defamatory statement made by Mr Judd was repeated by a newspaper and broadcast to the people 
at large, thereby considerably increasing the damage done to the plaintiff's reputation.193 In Stern v 
Piper the repetition rule is traced back as early as 1829,194 and Hirst LJ comments that it is 
supported by a weight of authority, having gained the final seal of approval from the House of Lords 
in Lewis v Daily Telegraph (Lewis).195 In Lewis the rule is expressed as having the effect that "a 
hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement"196 so that "repeating someone else's libellous 
statement is just as bad as making the statement directly".197 Simon Brown LJ comments in Stern v 
Piper that "[t]he very existence of the law of privilege to cover fair and accurate reporting of 
proceedings surely postulates that otherwise such reports would fall foul of the repetition rule."198 
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The courts have taken differing approaches to this rule in the recent cases featuring reportage. In 
Al-Fagih arguments that the defence of reportage was inconsistent with the repetition rule were 
dealt with by characterising the repetition rule as relating only to the defence of justification, and 
thus it was deemed not relevant to the field of privilege.199 In Roberts v Gable Ward LJ applied the 
same approach.200 However Sedley LJ accepted that the reportage defence had to be treated 
carefully as it modified the repetition rule, although exactly how it modified the rule his Lordship 
did not say.201 In Galloway Eady J in the High Court noted that it was important to ensure on the 
facts of any particular case that it really is a reportage case and that "the defendant is not simply 
seeking to flout the disciplines underlying the repetition rule."202 The Court of Appeal in Galloway 
refer to the reportage defence as an exception to the repetition rule.203 Therefore there appears to be 
differing opinions as to whether the reportage defence is consistent with the repetition rule or 
whether it is an exception. 
To evaluate these differing opinions it is necessary to further explore the repetition rule; clearly 
it is designed to prevent the repetition of libellous statements and thus "to protect the individual's 
right to his reputation".204  As well as the protection of reputation Eady J notes in Galloway that it 
also serves to prevent the public being misinformed.205 The policy inherent in this rule is that 
repetition does not lessen the defamatory meaning of a statement, nor does it make the repeater less 
culpable than the person who originally made the statement. By contrast the reportage defence 
seems to protect certain repeated statements on the assumption that they are less defamatory because 
they are reporting only the fact that the defamatory remark was made.206 Therefore when 
considering the policy behind the repetition rule it clearly appears to be "fundamentally 
incompatible"207 with the reportage defence.  
The repetition rule is not designed only to prevent people escaping liability in defamation 
through the defence of justification (by proving that somebody else did in fact make the libellous 
comment), but rather the purpose is to attribute liability for any republication of defamatory 
statements. As noted by Arden LJ in Curistan v Times Newspapers Ltd, "the policy of the rule 
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appears potentially to apply in all circumstances and irrespective of whether the meaning of a 
statement is that the publisher is only reporting that a statement has been made without adopting or 
endorsing it."208 It is apparent that prior to the extension of qualified privilege by Reynolds often 
the only possible avenue for exculpation by a defendant who did publish such a repetition was by 
way of justification. However the spirit of the rule was always to prevent repetition; thus it would 
seem to be concerned with repetition of libel regardless of which defence the defendant seeks to 
advance. Therefore it is the author's view that in the cases where the repetition rule has been 
regarded as limited only to the defence of justification, it has been dismissed too lightly based on its 
historical origins.  
 
B Further Criticisms of the Reportage Defence 
In Roberts v Gable counsel for the appellants, Mr Tomlinson QC, argued that the defence of 
reportage disrupted the balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation. It was 
Mr Tomlinson's view that the absence of a requirement of verification created an unacceptably wide 
"free fire zone".209 Mr Tomlinson argued that responsible journalism demanded verification and 
that the reportage defence should only be allowed when the following conditions are satisfied:210 
(1) there is a continuing and active public dispute on a matter of public interest 
(2) where the urgency of the matter makes verification in the ordinary way difficult or 
undesirable  
(3) the reported allegations are attributed and not adopted 
(4) the reported allegations do not involve misconduct which has wider ramifications – that is 
misconduct which potentially exposed those responsible to third party sanctions. 
These could serve as desirable parameters for the reportage defence as they would circumvent 
the uncertainty as to whether lack of verification is allowable in all circumstances. However it 
would undoubtedly be difficult to decide at the outset of a public dispute, precisely how "continuing 
and active" the dispute would be. The fourth point seems to limit the nature of the allegations being 
made. Such a limitation is potentially inconsistent with the rationale of the reportage defence, which 
is to protect certain publications where the purpose is to report the fact that the allegations were 
made. Perhaps these parameters would be a convenient method of restraining the defence of 
reportage so that any incursion on the rationale of the repetition rule would only occur in a limited 
set of circumstances. 
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A similar concern pointed out by Godwin Busuttil is that reportage seems to be "an absolute 
privilege in all but name: a privilege which permits reporting of unverified defamatory allegations, 
which cannot (in reality) be defeated by proof of malice."211 This concern arises because it seems 
very difficult to establish the requisite standard of reckless indifference to truth or falsity that is 
necessary in order to prove malice.212 Simon Brown LJ decided in Al-Fagih that malice could not 
be found (and therefore the defence of qualified privilege could not be defeated) merely by proving 
that the defendant failed to verify the allegations; instead it would have to be shown that the 
dominant motive for publishing was to injure the claimant.213 Eady J observed in Lillie & Reed v 
Newcastle City Council that although a finding of malice on such grounds is possible it is a remote 
possibility in light of recent authorities.214 The concern therefore is that there is no safeguard for 
reputation because the publisher is not obliged to verify the allegations in order to be protected by 
the reportage defence, and the person defamed is unlikely to be able to defeat this defence through a 
claim of malice.215 
C Rationale of the Reportage Defence 
Surprisingly there has been little consideration of whether this defence is warranted. This is 
because it has been regarded as a subspecies of Reynolds qualified privilege; "a special kind of 
responsible journalism but with distinctive features of its own" and thus "the underlying rationale 
justifying the defence is the public policy demand for there to be a duty to impart the information 
and an interest in receiving it".216 However to accept this basis without further consideration is to 
ignore the unique characteristics of reportage. This defence seems to run counter to the orthodoxy 
that "repeating someone else's libellous statement is just as bad as making the statement directly".217 
1 Arguments for the reportage defence 
Reportage permits the neutral recounting of defamatory statements of fact, which at first glance 
hardly seems to promote the "common convenience and welfare of society".218 However, the 
principal tenet of the defence, as emphasised by Ward LJ in Charman is "the effect of the report is 
not to adopt the truth of what is being said, but to record the fact that the statements which were 
  
211  Busuttil, above n 18, para 9.4. 
212  Ibid. 
213  Al-Fagih (CA), above n 30, para 55 Simon Brown LJ. 
214  Lillie & Reed v Newcastle City Council [2002] EWHC 1600, para 1091 (QB) Eady J. 
215  Busuttil, above n 18, para 9.4. 
216  Roberts v Gable (CA), above n 2, para 60 Ward LJ. 
217  Lewis, above n 196, 260 Lord Reid.  
218  Toogood v Spyring (1834) 149 ER 1044, 1050 Parke B.  
 
464 (2009) 40 VUWLR 
defamatory were made."219 Ward LJ goes on to emphasise this point saying "[n]o matter how 
overwhelming the public interest, it is not reportage simply to report with perfect accuracy and in 
the most neutral way the defamatory allegations A has uttered of B."220 It therefore appears that the 
implicit rationale of the reportage defence is that the publishers are under a duty to report the fact 
that defamatory allegations were made by A against B when there is a legitimate public interest in 
knowing this fact. This rationale could potentially explain why the repetition rule can be 
circumvented; if on the construction of the article it is just a report of the fact that the statement was 
made, then it should not be classed as repeating the allegation but only reporting this fact. Although 
the allegation may be reproduced verbatim within the article, the availability of the defence should 
hinge on the thrust of the article as a whole. One could draw a tenuous analogy to an argument 
concerning an antidote to the bane;221 that because the article is not adopting the allegation but 
rather just impartially reporting the fact that it was made, this neutralises the effect of repeating the 
libel. Even if the style of the reporting cannot properly be regarded as neutralising its defamatory 
effect, the inclusion of the defamatory statement is ancillary to the purpose of the article.  
Another potential justification for the reportage defence is that it is a concession to the demands 
of journalism and the often onerous task of verifying allegations, thus allowing the public to receive 
the newsworthy information in a timely fashion. This is alluded to by Simon Brown LJ in Al-Fagih 
who comments, "[i]n this situation it seems to me that the public is entitled to be informed of such a 
dispute without having to wait for the publisher, following an attempt at verification, to commit 
himself to one side or the other."222 This justification could explain why the only successful cases 
of the reportage defence (Al-Fagih and Roberts v Gable) have been instances where verification of 
the truth of the allegations was likely to have been a relatively difficult (and presumably time-
consuming) task. 
Some may say that a desirable consequence of the defence is to prevent defamed individuals 
going for the deeper pockets and pursuing defamation actions against the media, instead restricting 
them to seeking redress from the instigator of the statement. However it must be remembered that 
by the media reporting this allegation it serves to increase significantly the width of dissemination of 
the statement and thus the damage done to the claimant's reputation. 
2 Criticisms of the reportage rationale 
Whilst for the purposes of the defence subtle distinctions in language mark the difference 
between repeating an allegation and reporting the fact that it was said, it is debatable whether these 
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changes to the style of the reporting have such a significant effect on the minds of the ordinary 
reasonable reader of the publication. By simply ensuring that the report is neutral, unadopted and the 
thrust of it is the fact that the statement was made, one does not necessarily avoid the public drawing 
conclusions as to the truth of the defamatory statement; which they would have been unable to draw 
but for the publication of the article. Steven Price alludes to this point in saying "[e]ven the most 
neutral of reports is still publishing what may be a very damaging allegation, and surely the 
possibility of truth is a key part of what makes it newsworthy."223 Furthermore Godwin Busuttil 
notes "[i]n reality, damage to reputation, if there has been any, is caused by the appearance of the 
allegation in a newspaper, regardless of whether the journalist positively subscribes to its truth or 
not."224  
If the public interest which mandates the publication lies in the fact that the defamatory 
allegations are made, one wonders why it is even necessary to include the allegations. A bare report 
of the fact that defamatory allegations were made by A against B, could fairly be said to have an 
equivalent public interest value to an otherwise identical article that included the allegation; yet it is 
obvious that the public would be much less inclined to read the former article. If the defamatory 
allegations are to continue to be included in such reports perhaps the author should be required to 
explicitly record that they do not adopt or endorse the allegations instead of leaving the reader to 
imply this from the style of the report. 
Reporting the fact that the allegation was made is said to be in the public interest as it conveys 
information to the public about the character of the accuser; but it seems unjust that such 
circumstances should therefore warrant tarnishing the reputation of another. In Al-Fagih it was said 
that the report went to show that one or other if not both of the individuals concerned were being 
shown to be disreputable.225 Assuming only one of the individuals was actually acting disreputably 
(by defaming the other) why then should the other be defamed merely to portray this disreputable 
conduct?  
3 Further implications of the defence 
It is plausible that the neutral reportage defence may entice journalists to adopt this method of 
expression rather than pursuing investigative avenues in their "bloodhound" role, which was 
discussed in Charman as not falling within the ambit of the reportage defence.226 Prior to the 
reportage defence a defendant could only avoid liability through a defence of qualified privilege if 
they could show truly responsible journalism by rigorously adhering to the Reynolds factors. Now it 
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seems that such effort can be avoided merely by writing neutrally. This seems to foster the mere 
repetition of gossip which will sell newspapers through scandal rather than carefully researched 
investigative journalism; all on the pretence that the ordinary reasonable reader will not draw 
conclusions as to the truth or falsity of the reported allegations.  
The absence of verification under the reportage defence also gives rise to uncertainty. What will 
become of the defendant who undertakes some attempt at verification that is insufficient to satisfy 
the normal Reynolds standard of responsible journalism; have they then foregone their opportunity 
for a reportage defence? In Al-Fagih Simon Brown LJ whilst careful to convey that it would not 
necessarily always be the case, commented that "in the present context verification could even be 
thought inconsistent with the objective reporting of the dispute."227 It remains to be seen what 
impact attempt at verification would have on the availability of the reportage defence. 
In the event of failing to establish the defence of reportage, the fallback option would be 
traditional Reynolds qualified privilege which will not normally grant protection to a publisher who 
has not taken reasonable steps to verify the truth and accuracy of what is published.228 This 
difficulty is acknowledged by Sedley LJ in Charman:229  
It is the very dependence of a reportage defence on the bald retailing of libels which makes it 
forensically problematical to fall back upon an alternative defence of responsible journalism. Pleaders 
may need to decide which it is to be. 
4 Conclusions on rationale 
In the author's opinion attempts to find a sound principle for the reportage defence are most 
unsatisfactory. If there is enough public interest in knowing of the fact that allegations were made, 
the defence should be confined to just that, and as such it should be no more than "a prize for bland 
journalism".230 If journalists wish to sensationalise their articles by the inclusion of defamatory 
remarks they should not be able to hide behind the excuse that these were made by another. The 
absence of verification seems too lenient a concession to journalists given that one would assume 
the perpetrator of the allegation (with whom the journalist must have had some contact) would be in 
a prime position to be able to verify the truth of it.  
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D Relevance to the New Zealand Context 
The current approach to qualified privilege in New Zealand is found in the cases of Lange v 
Atkinson (Lange).231 These cases elucidated a defence that protects "generally-published statements 
which directly concern the functioning of representative and responsible government".232 Thus 
there exists a subject-matter test which restricts Lange qualified privilege to protecting only political 
speech. The validity of this restriction has recently been challenged in the High Court decision of 
Osmose New Zealand v Wakeling (Osmose) which appeared to extend the requisite subject-matter to 
merely that which is in the public interest;233 especially where it can be "loosely … defined as of a 
political nature."234 In New Zealand the distinction between occasion of privilege and misuse of the 
occasion has been maintained.235  
Lord Nicholls commented in the Privy Council decision in Lange that "striking a balance 
between freedom of expression and protection of reputation calls for a value judgment which 
depends upon local political and social conditions."236 Therefore when considering the application 
of the reportage defence to a New Zealand context reference must be made to such conditions. In 
Lange237 the Court of Appeal decided that the balance struck in Reynolds was not appropriate for 
the political and social conditions of New Zealand; one must therefore consider whether these 
conditions would similarly obstruct the application of the reportage defence.  
Among the distinguishing factors mentioned in Lange were the "differences between the 
responsibility and vulnerability of the media in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom".238 Such 
distinctions would be significant if the opportunity arose to decide whether to introduce a defence of 
reportage into New Zealand. In a very tentative generalisation the Court of Appeal in Lange 
commented that "it is possible to say that New Zealand has not encountered the worst excesses and 
irresponsibilities of the English national daily tabloids."239 There is no reason to believe that this 
gap in media climate between the United Kingdom and New Zealand has changed, and thus any 
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decision to allow a reportage defence could not be justified purely on the basis of following the 
United Kingdom approach.  
Assuming it was deemed appropriate to introduce the defence into New Zealand, the most 
significant change would be to the subject-matter restriction mentioned above. The reportage 
defence as it is formulated in the United Kingdom would considerably extend the width of 
protection of qualified privilege for widely disseminated statements; albeit only for reporting style 
journalism. As Steven Price notes if the defence were introduced in New Zealand, it would make 
little sense to confine the subject-matter according to the Lange test;240 if such a restriction were to 
be imposed it would be unlikely that the defence would afford any significant further protection than 
already exists under Lange.  
The principal feature of the reportage defence is that in certain circumstances verification of the 
truth of the statements is not required. Although the Court of Appeal in Lange held that 
consideration of the steps taken to verify the information are not relevant to the inquiry of whether 
the occasion is privileged,241 it appears that verification may be relevant to the question of misuse 
of occasion of privilege. In New Zealand misuse of the occasion of privilege is governed by section 
19 of the Defamation Act 1992. In interpreting this section the Court of Appeal in Lange comments 
that "the privilege may well be lost if the defendant takes what in all the circumstances can fairly be 
described as a cavalier approach to the truth of the statement."242 Given that no verification is 
required under the reportage defence this might exonerate even those defendants who were cavalier 
about the truth, provided that the publication was a neutral, unadopted report of the fact that the 
allegations were made. This feature of the defence might serve to broaden the reach of qualified 
privilege even if the subject-matter restriction was maintained. 
As indicated by Steven Price, if a reportage defence were to be introduced into New Zealand it 
would also need to be considered whether neutrality would be an aspect of the qualifying occasion 
or relevant to whether it was misused, or both.243 Regrettably space prevents further exploration of 
this point.  
It appears that logical progression towards a defence of reportage in New Zealand would first 
require relaxation of the subject-matter requirement of Lange; which may indeed have been 
achieved in Osmose. From there would follow a principled consideration (which space here 
precludes) of whether in the social and political climate of New Zealand it would be desirable to 
allow such a defence. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the reportage defence is an example of what Lord Nicholls in Reynolds has 
called the "elasticity of the common law principle".244 Whilst several features of the defence have 
been elucidated in the various cases; their precise ambit of application remains uncertain. At present 
the only successful cases of reportage involved allegations and counter-allegations made in the 
context of a dispute between political figures. 
It appears difficult to find a satisfactory principled basis for the defence of reportage. It is best 
viewed as a set of circumstances in which failure to verify the truth of the allegations is nevertheless 
found to be responsible; perhaps as a consequence of the "general exhortation"245 in Reynolds that 
"[a]ny lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication."246 
In the author's opinion the reportage defence is not desirable and is unwarranted both in light of 
principle and precedent (namely the repetition rule). Given the public interest lies only in the fact 
that the defamatory statements were made by, or against, somebody perhaps inclusion of the 
defamatory remark is unnecessary to discharge the duty upon the publisher. Alternatively the model 
proposed by Mr Tomlinson QC in Roberts v Gable could be adopted to restrain the application of 
the defence. 
In light of the unconvincing principled basis for the reportage defence New Zealand should be 
cautious in following this approach. This is especially so given the different political and social 
circumstances in New Zealand which warranted rejecting the Reynolds approach. Furthermore the 
reportage defence would drastically widen the subject-matter for which a qualified privilege defence 
is available. 
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